In this study, we examine the possibility of moral hazard in Korean borrower behavior through the time series and panel analysis related to the delinquency rate and the delinquency rate in Korea in view of the fact that moral hazard behavior of private debtor frequently occurs in major developed countries and Korean financial markets. In Korea, the direct and indirect intervention of the government on the credit crunch problem is more important than the bankruptcy system. In this paper, we examine the moral hazard
of individual borrowers in the financial market, focusing on the problem of credit delinquents.
As a result, since the credit crisis has been weak in the post -crisis period, there has been an increase in the number of credit defaulters as a result of intensifying competition among card companies. It is analyzed that the direct and indirect measures by the government on the problem of the credit defaulters create the expectation of debt cancellation and debt restructuring, and the moral hazard of the individual debtor has occurred. These moral hazard of debtors seems to have resulted in the repetition of a vicious circle as a result of further expanding the number of credit defaulters. [
표 2] 연체율에 대한 동태분석(OLS)
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